A penetration test looks for weaknesses in a defined system. A red team exercise tests whether your organisation spots and stops a real attacker in time. TLPT, threat-led penetration testing, is the red team test that the EU's DORA regulation requires of designated financial institutions, run under the eye of the supervisor.
Requests and proposals tend to use the three terms interchangeably. That causes trouble the moment you start hiring, because each calls for different people and a different budget. Ask for a pentest when you actually mean a red team and the wrong CVs land on your desk.
What a penetration test is for
In a penetration test, an ethical hacker tries to break into a system you have scoped in advance: a web application, an API, a cloud environment or the internal network. Your IT team knows it is happening. The tester works to an agreed scope, usually for anything from a few days to a few weeks, and delivers a report setting out the findings, how serious each one is and how to fix it.
A pentest answers one question: where are the holes in this system? That makes it the right tool for a new application, after a major change, or as a fixed part of your testing programme. It tells you very little about detection, since your SOC either knows the test is running or has been told to ignore the alerts.
For financial institutions, regular testing is no longer optional. DORA requires every financial entity apart from microenterprises to run a digital operational resilience testing programme. Under Article 24, all ICT systems and applications supporting critical or important functions must be tested appropriately at least once a year, and Article 25 lists penetration testing among the possible tests, alongside vulnerability scans and network security assessments. The Dutch markets regulator, the AFM, notes that internal or external testers may carry out these annual tests, provided conflicts of interest are avoided.
How a red team exercise differs
A red team behaves like a genuine attacker with a concrete objective, such as reaching the payment systems or the CFO's mailbox. It picks its own route in: a phishing campaign, a weak password at a supplier, a forgotten server, or simply tailgating a member of staff through the front door. People, processes and technology are all fair game.
A red team exercise answers a different question from a pentest: does your blue team, the people responsible for detection and response, notice the attack, and how quickly do they act? That is why almost nobody in the organisation is told. Only a small control group, often called the white team, is in the know and can halt the exercise if something goes wrong.
Red team exercises run longer than pentests and usually start with threat intelligence: which attackers target your sector, and with what techniques? The scenarios are built on that. Afterwards the red and blue teams sit down together and replay the attack step by step, which is where most of the learning happens.
What TLPT adds under DORA
TLPT is red teaming done to a fixed rulebook, with the supervisor involved. Article 26 of DORA requires designated financial entities to carry one out at least every three years, a frequency the supervisor can adjust to the entity's risk profile. Each test covers several or all critical or important functions and runs on live production systems. DORA ties the method to TIBER-EU, the European framework for threat intelligence-based ethical red teaming.
Who has to test is the supervisor's call. In the Netherlands, the AFM explains that either the AFM or the Dutch central bank, DNB, makes the designation, depending on which of them granted the licence, and that an institution falling under both can run a joint test. Microenterprises and entities under the simplified ICT framework are not designated. According to the AFM, the active testing phase lasts at least twelve weeks. DNB notifies the institutions it designates; its Test Cyber Team then marks the official start and, once the process has met the requirements, issues an attestation. The institution itself writes a summary report with lessons learned and improvement actions.
DORA sets requirements for the testers too. They need proven expertise in threat intelligence, penetration testing and red teaming, must be certified or bound by a code of ethics, and need professional indemnity insurance. If you use an internal red team, external testers have to be brought in at least every third test.
Not designated for TLPT but keen to test along the same lines? Have a look at DNB's ART framework, a modular offshoot of TIBER aimed at institutions that are not yet ready for a full TIBER test or want to test more often. DNB says that in specific circumstances ART can be used to meet the Article 24 testing requirements.
The specialists behind each type of test
For a pentest, you need a tester who knows your kind of environment. Someone strong on web applications is not automatically good at Active Directory or an Azure tenant. Ask about recent work on comparable systems and request an anonymised report. A certification such as OSCP says something about hands-on skill; the quality of the report tells you far more about what you will actually get.
A red team exercise calls for a team: a red team lead who designs the scenario and keeps the exercise on track, operators who carry out the attack, and someone covering threat intelligence. On your side sits the white team, a handful of people with authority, typically the CISO plus someone from the board or the risk function. Our page on red teaming describes these roles in more detail.
TLPT adds a project layer. The institution has to prepare the test, procure the providers, agree the scope with the supervisor and follow up the improvement actions afterwards. That is project work with a clear start and finish, which makes it a good fit for an interim TLPT coordinator or control team lead on the institution's side.
Do not forget the blue team. A TLPT or red team exercise almost always produces improvements to detection and response, and someone has to deliver them. Without that capacity, all you are left with is a report.
Where to start
My view is that you should start with good pentests and a detection team that can actually see something. A red team exercise only pays off once your blue team is mature enough to learn from it. If an organisation has no working logging, or nobody watching the alerts overnight, a red team will always get in. You end up paying a lot of money for an outcome you could have predicted.
Try this yourself. Can you say today which systems send logs to your SIEM, who picks up an alert at three in the morning and how long that takes? If not, put your money there first. My piece on building a SOC team covers how to grow that capability step by step.
Designated institutions are in a different position, because the TLPT is coming regardless. Use the years beforehand to get detection in order. A TLPT that only exposes blind spots you already knew about is worth less than one that tells you something new. If you work in banking, my article on privileged access management under DORA is worth a read too, since admin accounts are nearly always a target in these tests.
Looking for a pentester, a red team lead or someone to coordinate your TLPT from the inside? Our page on hiring a penetration tester explains how we work, and through MVPeople we place interim security specialists. Or call or email me and we can work out which test suits you now.

